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David E. Feller: The Happy Warrior
Theodore J. St. Antoinet
Dave Feller and I first became acquainted when we were both union
lawyers in Washington, D.C. Dave was the ultimate happy warrior. He went
joyous into combat, and years later he could recount, joyously, objectively,
and without rancor toward old foes, the exact details of the many triumphs
and the few defeats. A favorite story came from his Supreme Court
clerkship. Dave was already seven years out of Harvard Law School, with
experience in university teaching, Army intelligence, and the Justice
Department, and he didn't hesitate to tell Chief Justice Vinson he should
vote for certiorari in a case close to Dave's heart. When Vinson remained
adamantly opposed, Dave lobbied his fellow clerks to lobby their Justices to
counter the Chief. Dave prevailed and Vinson, outraged by this treasonous
behavior, fired Dave. But Dave's was too fine a mind to be lost to the
Court, and his clerkship was soon restored.
The peppery, brilliant Felix Frankfurter was a more kindred spirit.
Frankfurter took an interest in star clerks, regardless of their home
chambers, and he and Dave became friendly during Dave's clerkship. In
subsequent years, when Dave would be awaiting his turn in oral argument
before the Court, one could see Frankfurter lean over from the bench and
wink broadly at him. Then Dave's case would be called and the two of them
would go at it, hammer and tongs.
After his clerkship Dave became a lawyer for the old CIO and the
Steelworkers, later forming a partnership with Arthur Goldberg and Elliot
Bredhoff. Dave loved to relate how Goldberg said he wanted "an Irishman
who can talk fast in a loud voice about things he knows nothing about." A
mutual friend, Tom Harris, exclaimed, "That's David Feller!" Dave was
hired and the string of Supreme Court victories began.
An early case reflects Dave's subtlety and foresight. In Guss (1957),'
after the National Labor Relations Board had declined jurisdiction on the
basis of its dollar jurisdictional standards, a Steelworkers local obtained a
ruling from Utah's labor board that an employer had violated the state labor
James E. & Sarah A. Degan Professor Emeritus of Law, University of Michigan.
1. Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd.. 353 U.S. I (1957).
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statute. But David concluded this would be bad for the labor movement as a
whole. He reasoned that it opened the way for increasing state regulation
and that instead federal preemption should control, even though the result
would be a "no-man's land" unregulated by either federal or state law. So
Dave filed a brief urging reversal and, as he wryly put it, "we succeeded in
losing the case."
Arthur Goldberg argued the landmark Lincoln Mills (1957) case,
establishing the applicability and constitutionality of Section 301 of the
Taft-Hartley Act3 as the source of federal "common law" for the
enforcement of union-employer contracts. Dave was the main author of the
brief. Thereafter he became the firm's principal advocate in oral arguments
before the Supreme Court. Dave handled such important cases as Dowd Box
(1962), 4 holding that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction with federal
courts to enforce labor contracts; Fibreboard (1964),' holding that
subcontracting of maintenance work within a plant is a mandatory subject
of bargaining; and Vaca v. Sipes (1967),6 holding that a union violates its
duty of fair representation only when its action is arbitrary, discriminatory,
or in bad faith.
The crowning achievement of Dave's career as an advocate was the
Steelworkers Trilogy (1960).' Dave argued in all three cases, with Elliot
Bredhoff joining him in one. The Trilogy placed the imprimatur of federal
law on the labor arbitration process. If an arbitration clause on its face
covers a dispute and there is no clear exclusion, a court should order
arbitration even if it regards the claim as frivolous. If an award "draws its
essence" from the labor contract, and there is no fraud or exceeding of the
arbitrator's authority, a court should enforce the award without reviewing
its merits. Dave said that on the day of the decision, he walked out onto the
Supreme Court's steps and thought: "I'll never top this. It would be only
fitting if I were struck dead on the spot!"
When Arthur Goldberg became Secretary of Labor in 1961, Dave
became head of the firm of Feller, Bredhoff & Anker as well as General
Counsel of the Steelworkers and of the Industrial Union Department of the
merged AFL-CIO. But eventually Dave lost the Steelworkers as a client
after I.W. Abel ousted Dave McDonald as the Union's President, and he
lost the IUD after a falling out with Walter Reuther over Dave's insistence
2. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
3. Labor Management Relations Act § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (2000).
4. Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
5. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
6. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
7. United Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior &
Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S.
593 (1960).
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on expressing his own views. Goldberg's ascent to the Supreme Court was
also costly, since Goldberg had to recuse himself in cases that Dave
handled. Dave reported that he still had plenty of union business and "made
a lot of money but it wasn't as satisfying." In 1967 Dave decided to move
to Berkeley and become a law teacher and labor arbitrator. The jaunty
warrior proved a master of this new world as well.
I had preceded Dave into teaching law by two years, and by 1967 was
working on the revision of one of the standard labor law casebooks. Dave
reported he had looked over the crop of existing casebooks and was
dissatisfied with all of them. "I told the kids I was waiting for your revision
to be published, Ted," said Dave. "You too came out of active practice and
you'll know what these students should be taught." I gulped. My revision
consisted mostly of updating and a little rearranging of material in what I
considered a basically sound work. I was sure Dave would be no more
satisfied with my version than with its predecessors. Indeed, when the new
edition came out, I heard-quite uncharacteristically-not a word from
Dave. In due course the publisher noted that Berkeley had not adopted our
fine new product. Dave had his own way of doing things and no other
would suffice. The results speak for themselves. The men and women who
went into labor law as a career because of Dave's teaching are legion.
Despite his background as a vigorous union advocate, Dave was
quickly accepted as an arbitrator by both management and labor. It was
typical of his finely calibrated mind that he took particular pride in one case
where his award was subsequently vacated by a court. "We both got it
right!" Dave declared gleefully. "The collective bargaining agreement
called for conduct that violated public law. My job was to interpret and
apply that contract," he explained. "I ruled the action did not breach the
contract. The court's job was to interpret and apply the law. The court held
the contract was unenforceable. Each of our positions was perfectly sensible
and consistent with the other."
Dave's success as an arbitrator soon led to his membership in the
National Academy of Arbitrators, an organization of over 600 of the
country's leading labor arbitrators. In 1992 Dave became President of the
Academy. His term was scheduled to be capped by the 1993 annual meeting
in Denver. Then came a brouhaha. The State of Colorado had recently
adopted a constitutional amendment 8 that purported to annul any municipal
ordinances prohibiting discrimination against gays and lesbians. Some
vocal Academy members urged a relocation of the meeting as a rebuke to
Colorado. Ironically, however, Denver was one of the very cities whose
antidiscrimination ordinances had prompted the State's effort at
8. The U.S. Supreme Court ultimately declared the Colorado provision unconstitutional as a
denial of equal protection. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
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preemption. Dave, clear-headed as usual amidst the clamor, saw a boycott
of Denver as punishing the victim instead of the culprit. He insisted that the
meeting stay put and it did.
In his Presidential Address that year, Dave focused on the Steelworkers
Trilogy. 9 Instead of reveling in his great triumph, however, he all but
delivered a funeral oration. Recent rulings had held that the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA)" created a body of federal substantive law, binding
on the states, for the enforcement of arbitration agreements. That rendered
Lincoln Mills and its progeny largely unnecessary, except insofar as Section
301 was still needed for an action in federal court." Moreover, and much
worse in Dave's eyes, language in Enterprise Wheel,'2 the third of the
Steelworkers Trilogy, would enable a court that disagreed with an arbitral
award to set it aside on the grounds it did not draw its "essence" from the
collective bargaining agreement.' 3 For Dave, the anomalous result was that
labor arbitration awards now appeared more vulnerable under Enterprise
and Section 301 than commercial awards under the FAA.'4
One of Dave Feller's major contributions to the National Academy of
Arbitrators was his authorship of a series of amicus briefs in several leading
Supreme Court cases. Nearly all his briefs were winners. In Misco (1987)"
the Court went most of the way with Dave in sharply limiting the basis for
setting aside an arbitration award on the grounds of public policy. The
policy would have to be "explicit," "well defined and dominant," and
ascertainable "by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from
general considerations of supposed public interests."' 6
In Wright (1998)' 7 Dave supplied the key by which the Court was able
to avoid the difficult question of whether a union could waive employees'
rights to sue on a statutory discrimination claim and instead require them to
9. David E. Feller, Presidential Address: Bye-bye Trilogy, Hello Arbitration! in ARBITRATION
1993: ARBITRATION AND THE CHANGING WORLD OF WORK, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-SIXTH
ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS I (Gladys W. Gruenberg ed. 1994).
Io. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
11. Feller, supra note 9, at 4. The FAA does not constitute an independent basis for federal
jurisdiction.
12. 363 U.S. at 597.
13. Feller, supra note 9, at 7. Section 10(a) of the FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2000), provides for four
limited grounds for the vacatur of arbitration awards. In essence they are (1) fraud; (2) arbitrator
partiality; (3) arbitrator misconduct; and (4) arbitrators' exceeding of their powers. The lower courts,
however, have added several nonstatutory grounds. See generally Stephen L. Hayford, The Federal
Arbitration Act: Key to Stabilizing and Strengthening the Law of Labor Arbitration, 21 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 521,549-53 (2000).
14. Feller, supra note 9, at 9-10.
15. United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29 (1987). See also E. Associated
Coal Corp. v. UMW Dist. 17, 531 U.S. 57 (2000).
16. Misco, 484 U.S. at 43.
17. Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70 (1998).
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submit the grievance to arbitration. In keeping with Dave's argument, the
Court concluded that at least such a waiver would have to be "clear and
unmistakable." 8  Dave produced a genuine tour-de-force in a case
involving baseball player Steve Garvey. 9 The Ninth Circuit had vacated an
award denying Garvey collusion damages because it found the arbitrator's
findings so implausible that he must have "dispensed his own brand of
industrial justice," contrary to the mandate of Enterprise.20 Dave contended,
alone of all the participants, that the court of appeals had so clearly erred in
substituting its judgment for the arbitrator's that no oral argument was
necessary but that a per curiam opinion by the Supreme Court was needed
to reaffirm the Misco standards. The Court followed this script to the letter,
reversing the Ninth Circuit's decision and declaring it "nothing short of
baffling.'
Dave was a formidable figure at Academy meetings when he strode to
the microphone to analyze a problem, trenchantly and brusquely, often with
an arcane bit of history or some biting humor thrown in. Yet this fearsome
debater could not have been more solicitous toward younger arbitrators
anguishing over a decision. His most powerful advice was invariably to the
effect: "Decide it! Decide it! Have the courage of your convictions!" Dave
was also unlike some respected senior members of the Academy who have
been criticized for being too cliquish. He regularly went out of his way to
welcome newcomers and spend time with them at the social events of the
Academy.
Even Dave Feller had to meet the academic world's publication
requirements for tenure. He did it with a flourish, in a highly original,
provocative article of almost two hundred pages on the nature of collective
bargaining agreements. 2' Dave's thesis was that the usual labor agreement
is only a contract between the employer and the union, not the employer
and the employees. For employees with a claim against their employer, the
sole resort is ordinarily the enforcement of the arbitration clause - a matter
within the union's discretion, subject only to its duty of fair representation.
Agree with him or not, one cannot help but marvel at the skill and ingenuity
with which Dave marshals his arguments. Beginning law students and
veteran scholars alike could profit from one lesson in particular. While
Dave takes a back seat to nobody in his mastery of theory, he always starts
with the ficts of individual cases-frequently cases whose full significance
18. Id. at 80.
19. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504 (2001).
20. Garvey v. Roberts, 203 F.3d 580, 588, 590-91 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Enterprise, 363 U.S. at
597).
21. Garvey, 532 U.S. at 510.
22. David E. Feller, A General Theory of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61 CAL. L. REV.
663 (1973).
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only Dave had recognized.
Was Dave ever wrong about a legal issue? Over the years there were
several matters on which he and I disagreed, and naturally I like to think he
was wrong about all of those. But there is only one on which I am confident
history will come down against him. In 1981, 1 presented a paper at the
annual meeting of the National Academy of Arbitrators, urging that the
United States should adopt the recommendations of the International Labor
Organization and join all the other major industrial democracies of the
world in eliminating the pernicious doctrine of employment at-will.23
Under that rule, in the absence of a specific statutory prohibition or
contractual limitation, employers may, as once famously stated, "dismiss
their employees at will .... for good cause, for no cause or even for cause
morally wrong."24 In the discussion following my presentation, Dave
opposed my position. I have always thought he was influenced by a notion
common among an older generation of union lawyers. This was that
employees are best protected against unjust discipline by collectively
bargained arbitration procedures and that statutory safeguards undercut a
major argument for unionization. For somewhat similar reasons organized
labor initially opposed the Fair Labor Standards Act.2" Yet experience has
shown that unions can almost always build on the minimum protections or
floor erected by legislation. On the assumption that Dave was mistaken on
at-will employment, however, it is actually refreshing to realize that his
judgment was not infallible.
How does one sum up a person of such stature? Dave Feller was a
consummate craftsman, a dauntless advocate, an inspiring teacher, and a
born leader. He had a mind as quick and sharp as a rapier, and a wit equally
nimble and piercing. He was totally lacking in pretension himself, and he
would brook no overweening poses in others. Although legendary as an
imaginative, even wily, legal thinker, he was the soul of integrity when it
came to informing a court about what it was entitled to know. And beyond
his public persona, Dave was a warm, lively, multifaceted human being,
who treated his wife Gilda 6 as the full intellectual partner she was, and all
the rest of us, without regard to title or status, according to our own
individual merits.
23. Theodore J. St. Antoine, Protection Against Unjust Discipline: An Idea Whose Time Has Long
Since Come, in ARBITRATION ISSUES FOR THE 1980s, PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-FOURTH ANNUAL
MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 43 (James L. Stern & Barbara D. Dennis eds. 1982).
24. Payne v. W. & AtI. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884).
25. FOSTER RHEA DULLES, LABOR IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 283-84 (2d rev. ed. 1960).
26. At a social gathering someone kept referring to Gilda as "Carmen." Finally, Dave could stand
it no longer and quipped tersely, "You have the wrong opera!"
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